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EVIDENCE-SAFEGUARDING ADMISSIBILITY OF HYPNOTICALLY 
ENHANCED TESTIMONY-S'tate v. Hurd, 86 N.J. 525, 432 A.2d 86 
(1981). 
I. INTRODUCTION 
State v. Hurd I involved the admissibility of hypnotically en­
hanced testimony of the victim of an assault in an attempt to refresh 
her recollection of the crime.2 At approximately 5:45 a.m. on the 
morning of June 22, 1978, Jane Sell was attacked and stabbed while 
asleep in her apartment bedroom.3 Mrs. Sell survived the many 
knife wounds but was unable4 to describe her assailant after the at­
tack.s Subsequently, she agreed to undergo hypnosis by a psychia­
trist6 to enhance her recollection of the incident. 7 
Less than two weeks after the incident. Mrs. Sell. accomoanied . . ~ 
by her present husband and two officers from the prosecutor's office 
went to visit Dr. Herbert Spiegel, a noted hypnotist.s Once induced 
into a hypnotic state, Mrs. Sell relived the attack.9 At one point 
during the session, she was asked if her assailant was her former 
husband,1O and she responded affirmatively. I I When she was 
L 86 N.J. 525,432 A.2d 86 (1981). 
2. Id. at 530, 432 A.2d at 88. 
3. The evidence shows that the assailant did not intend to rob Mrs. Sell or commit 
a sexual act upon her. /d. at 529, 432 A.2d at 88. 
4. When an individual experiences a sequence of events which are extremely emo­
tional, recall of those events is frequently hazy, thus explaining Mrs. Sell's lack of recall. 
See DePiano & Salzberg, Hypnosis as an Aid 10 Recall of Meaningful Information 
Presented under Three Types ofArousal, 29 INT'L J. OF CLiN. & EXPER. HYPNOSIS 383, 
383 (1981). 
5. 86 N.J. at 530,432 A.2d at 88. While in the hospital emergency room, Mrs. Sell 
asked the police to "check out" her former husband but she did not identify the defend­
ant as the attacker at that point in time. Id. 
6. The prosecutor's office suggested that Mrs. Sell visit a psychiatrist. Id. 
7. Id. It is essential that the subject be motivated and willing to contribute mean­
ingfully to the investigation of the crime in order for hypnosis to be helpful in jogging the 
subject's memory. Schafer & Rubio, Hypnosis to Aid the Recall of Witnesses, 26 INT'L J. 
OF CLiN. & EXPER. HYPNOSIS, 81, 83 (1978). 
8. 86 N.J. at 530, 432 A.2d at 88. 
9. Id. at 531, 432 A.2d at 89. Before inducing Mrs. Sell into hypnosis, Dr. Spiegel 
questioned Mrs. Sell on her memory of the event. During this interview, and the subse­
quent hypnotic session, a tape recorder was used to record the session. Id., 432 A.2d at 
88. 
10. Mrs. Sell was previously married to the defendant. After her divorce, she re­
281 
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brought out of the trance, she expressed doubt about her recollec­
tion; nevertheless, she was encouraged by Dr. Spiegel and Detective 
Pierangeli to make a positive identification, which she did six days 
later. 12 On the basis of this identification, Mrs. Sell's former hus­
band was indicted. 13 
The trial court suppressed the identification in Slale v. Hurd,14 
concluding that the hypnotist and law enforcement officials had ex­
erted pressure on Mrs. Sell and induced her into identifying the de­
fendanLls The court declined, however, to hold that hypnotically 
enhanced testimonyl6 was inadmissible per se .17 Rather, it imposed 
upon the state the burden of establishing the reliability of hypnoti­
cally enhanced testimony by clear and convincing evidence. IS The 
trial court then adopted six procedural safeguards that were pro­
posed by Dr. Martin T. Ome,19 an expert witness for the defense 
who specifically designed the safeguards to guarantee reliability.20 
married and lived with her present husband and her three sons, two of whom are chil­
dren from her previous marriage to the defendant. Id at 530, 432 A.2d at 88. At the 
time of the assault, she had been divorced from the defendant for seven years although 
they continued to disagree over visitation rights and the disposition of jointly owned 
property. Id 
II. Id at 531, 432 A.2d at 89. Detective Marilyn Pierangeli asked Mrs. Sell if the 
assailant was someone she knew. Mrs. Sell answered "Yes." When asked if it was her 
present husband, she responded "No." When asked if her first husband assaulted her, 
she responded affirmatively with emotion. ld 
12. Id at 531-32, 432 A.2d at 89. 
13. Id at 532, 432 A.2d at 89. The defendant was "charged with assault with in­
tent to kill, atrocious assault and battery, assault with a deadly weapon, possession of a 
dangerous knife, and breaking and entry with intent to assault." Id 
14. 173 N.l. Super. 333, 369, 414 A.2d 291, 309 (Law Div. 1980), affd, 86 N.l. 525, 
432 A.2d 86 (1981). 
15. ld. 
16. For purposes of this article, the terms refreshed, enhanced, induced and influ­
enced will be used interchangeably when discussing testimony which was the product of 
hypnosis. 
17. 173 N.l. Super. at 369, 414 A.2d at 309. The trial court found that the potential 
for fanl..lsy and confabulation during a hypnotic session dictates that hypnotically re­
freshed evidence should not be given automatic admissibility. ld at 362, 414 A.2d at 
305. 
18. Id at 364, 414 A.2d at 306-07. 
19. Dr. Orne, Director of the Unit for Experimental Psychiatry at Pennsylvania 
Hospital, and an expert in the field of hypnosis, has been a frequent critic of the use of 
hypnosis in the legal process. For a current analysis of Dr. Orne's viewpoint, see gener­
ally Orne, The Use and Misuse ofHypnosis in Court, 3 CRIME & lUST. 61 (1980). 
20. 173 N.l. Super. at 363, 414 A.2d at 306. The safeguards are: 
(I) The hypnotic session should be conducted by a licensed psychiatrist or 
psychologist trained in the use of hypnosis. 
(2) The qualified professional conducting the hypnotic session should be in­
dependent of and not responsible to the prosecutor, investigator or the defense. 
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed and adopted the six 
safeguards articulated by the trial court. 21 This article will initially 
summarize the controversy surrounding the admissibility of hypnoti­
cally enhanced testimony, bring forth the cases and leading articles 
which led up to and culminated in the Hurd decision, and analyze 
the viability of the Hurd safeguards. Finally, the ramifications of 
Hurd in future cases will be discussed. 
II. RELIABILITY OF HYPNOTICALLY ENHANCED TESTIMONY 
The use of hypnosis as an investigatory tool arises because in a 
traumatic situation, an individual may focus on certain aspects of the 
event while giving little attention to peripheral aspects.22 Often, 
these peripheral aspects cannot be recalled without the use of hypno­
sis, even though they were recorded by the mind.23 In the last dec­
ade, hypnosis has been used in law enforcement to allow victims and 
witnesses the opportunity to enhance their memories concerning 
events that have subsequentiy resulted in criminal prosecution.24 
Critics of the use of hypnosis argue that the practice results in a 
(3) Any information given to the hypnotist by law enforcement personnel 
prior to the hypnotic session must be in written form so that subsequently the 
extent of the information the subject received from the hypnotist may be 
determined. 
(4) Before introduction of hypnosis, the hypnotist should obtain from the sub­
ject a detailed description of the facts as the subject remembers them, carefully 
avoiding adding any new elements to the witness' description of the events. 
(5) All contacts between the hypnotist and the subject should be recorded so 
that a permanent record is available for comparison and study to establish that 
the witness has not recieved information or suggestion which might later be 
reported as having been first described by the subject during hypnosis. Video­
tape should be employed if possible, but should not be mandatory. 
(6) Only the hypnotist and the subject should be present during any phase of 
the hypnotic session, including the pre-hypnotic testing and post-hypnotic 
interview. 
Id 
If these procedures are followed, the court must still be "satisfied that there was no 
impermissibly suggestive or coercive conduct by the hypnotist and law enforcement per­
sonnel connected with the hypnotic exercise ...." Id at 364, 414 A.2d at 306. 
21. 86 N.J. at 545, 549, 432 A.2d at 96, 99. 
22. Zelig & Beidleman, The Investigative Use 0/Hypnosis: A Word 0/Caution, 39 
INT'L J. OF CLiN. & EXPER. HYPNOSIS, 401, 402 (1981) (citing Stratton, The Use ofHyp­
nosis in Law En/orcement Crimina/Investigations: A Pilot Program, 5 J. POLICE SCI. AD. 
399,400 (1977) where it was concluded that by relaxing and focusing on other aspects of 
the criminal events, the hypnotic subject has greater recall of peripheral events and 
incidents). 
23. Zelig & Beidleman, supra note 22, at 402. 
24. Monrose, Justice With Glazed Eyes: The Growing Use of Hypnotism in Law 
En/orcement, JURIS DR., Oct.-Nov. 1978, at 54. 
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state of altered consciousness and heightened suggestibility whereby 
a subject experiences distortions of reality, false memories, fantasies, 
and confabulation.25 Critics claim that the. foremost problem in us­
ing hypnosis is that the hypnotist unintentionally causes the subject 
to conform to the hypnotist's point ofview.26 Other potential pitfalls 
include the subject's ability to lie even while in a deep hypnotic 
trance,27 and the risk that the subject may unintentionally respond to 
implicit stimuli that emanate unknowingly from the hypnotist and 
are unrecognized by the subject.28 The desire to please the hypnotist 
often induces the subject to mirror the attitude that he senses from 
the hypnotist's questions and behavior.29 One team of experts be­
lieves that the very wording of questions may distort the witness' 
memory.30 Still other critics of forensic hypnosis charge that it re­
sembles totalitarian mind manipulation and that amateur hypnotists 
may conjure up "memories" that, in reality, are more fantasy than 
fact. 3I 
Despite such criticism, however, several experts believe that 
hypnosis may be valuable to law enforcement officials when profes­
sionals administer the procedure.32 It is believed that hypnosis may 
help an eyewitness recall an incident more accurately, including im­
portant details that would not have otherwise been recalled.33 Police 
detectives and other proponents insist that hypnosis is a safe and 
effective tool which is instrumental in saving time in difficult cases. 
It has been characterized as a "miraculous divining rod of sortS."34 
Those involved in the field of hypnosis, however, have resisted 
the training of police officers to administer hypnosis. The Executive 
25. ENCYCLOPEADIA BRITANNICA Hypnosis 133, 139 (15th ed. 1974). 
26. See Kroger & Douce, Hypnosis in Criminal Investigation, 27 INT'L J. OF CLIN. 
& EXPER. HYPNOSIS 358, 366 (1979). 
27. Id 
28. Id 
29. Spector & Foster, Admissibility ofHypnotic Statements: Is the Law ofEvidence 
Susceptible? 38 OHIO ST. L.J. 567, 591 (1977). 
30. Hilgard & Loftus, Effective Interrogation ofthe Eyewitness, 27 INT'L J. OF CLIN. 
& EXPER. HYPNOSIS 342, 342 (1979). The authors found that leading questions serve 
only to distort the witness' memory. Id 
3'. Alsop, Clue That Is Buried In the Subconscious May Crack the Case, Wall St. 
J., June 27, 1978 at 1, col. 4. 
32. See generally Schafer & Rubio, supra note 7. 
33. Monrose, supra note 23, at 55; see also Reiser, Hypnosis as an Aidin a Homicide 
Investigation, 17 AM. J. OF CLIN. HYPNOSIS 84 (1974), in which it was concluded that 
even a witness whose thought pattern was impaired by drugs and alcohol may have his 
memory refreshed while under hypnosis assuming the witness is eager to contribute 
meaningfully to the investigation. Id at 87. 
34. Monrose, supra note 23, at 55. 
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Council of the Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis35 
unanimously adopted a resolution forbidding police officers from 
hypnotizing prospective witnesses because of potential bias and lack 
of expertise.36 
Martin T. Orne, the expert who promulgated the safeguards 
that were accepted in Hurd,37 believes that the use of hypnosis is 
useful to refresh memories and to facilitate eyewitness identifications 
when neither the subject, the authorities, nor the hypnotist have 
preconceptions as to who the criminal may be.38 He warns, however, 
that where such preconceptions do exist, hypnosis may "cause the 
subject to confabulate the person who is suspected into his 'hypnoti­
cally enhanced memories.' "39 
In light of such problems, experts have suggested alternatives 
ranging from a complete ban of the use of hypnosis as an investiga­
tory tool,4O to viewing hypnosis with extreme caution limiting its em­
ployment to situations where it is imperative that a key witness have 
his memory "unlocked."41 
Most experts agree, however, that the use of hypnosis to obtain 
35. The Society for Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis is a major professional 
association in the field of hypnosis. See Margolin, Hypnosis-Enhanced Testimony: Valid 
Evidence or Prosecutor's Tool? 17 TRIAL 42 (Oct. 1981). 
36. The resolution, passed in October 1978, contained the following language: 
Because we recognize that hypnotically aided recall may produce either accu­
rate memories or at times may facilitate the creation of pseudo memories, or 
fantasies that are accepted as real by subject and hypnotist alike, we are deeply 
troubled by the utilization of this techniques [sic) among the police. It must be 
emphasized that there is no known way of distinguishing with certainty be­
tween actual recall and pseudo memories except by independent verification 
. . . . [P)olice officers usually have strong views as to who is likely to be guilty 
of a crime and may easily inadvertently bias the hypnotized subject'S memories 
even without themselves being aware of their actions. 
27 INT'L J. OF CLiN. & EXPER. HYPNOSIS 452, 452 (1979). 
37. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text. 
38. Orne, The Use and Misuse ofHypnosis in Court, 27 INT'L J. OF CLiN. & EXPER. 
HYPNOSIS 311, 311 (1979). 
39. Id DePiano and Salzberg found that hypnosis yields positive effects only 
under very selected conditions such as: ( I) When meaningful information is recalled; 
(2) when the material recalled is linked to a connected series of events; (3) when material 
is incidentally, not intentionally learned; and (4) when used on subjects who have been 
emotionally aroused during the learning process. DePiano & Salzberg, supra note 4, at 
386-87. 
40. Diamond, Inherent Problems in the Use ofPretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective 
Witness, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 313,349 (1980). 
41. Dilloff, The Admissibility ofHypnotically Influenced Testimony, 4 OHIO N.U.L. 
REv. I, 23 (1977). Dilloff believes that a witness whose memory has been hypnotically 
refreshed should be allowed to testify in some circumstances although the cross-examiner 
should be given the opportunity to impeach such testimony. Id. at 22. 
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leads and clues is the most appropriate area for the science.42 When 
the sole motive for using hypnosis is to provide clues that ultimately 
will lead to incriminating evidence, the mere fact that hypnosis was 
employed becomes unimportant.43 The statements given during the 
hypnosis are not admissible, only the clues derived therefrom are 
helpful. Thus, when information obtained through hypnosis leads to 
the investigation of a suspect who can be convicted by additional, 
material evidence, the use of hypnosis is appropriate.44 
A. Hypnotically Enhanced Testimony as Scient!fic Evidence 
In 1923, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia established the standard for admitting scientific evidence 
in Frye v. United States ,45 a standard which is still applicable.46 The 
court found that a scientific principle may produce important evi­
dence, but that the principle must first be sufficiently established to 
have gained general acceptability in its field.47 Accordingly, several 
courts that have been faced with hypnotically enhanced testimony 
have had to ascertain whether experts in the field of hypnosis believe 
that hypnosis yields reliable results and is a generally accepted scien­
tific principle.48 
Around the turn of the century, courts found hypnotically en­
hanced evidence to be unreasonable and contrary to all rational ex­
perience.49 Research continued, however, and in 1968, Harding v. 
State 50 became the first reported decision allowing the use of hypno­
sis to enhance the memory of a witness. Harding did not specifically 
42. See Orne, supra note 33, at 327. 
43. Id at 328. 
44. See Schafer & Rubio, supra note 7, at 90. 
45. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
46. The Frye test has been the target of frequent criticism in that general accept­
ance should not go to the question of admissibility but only to the weight to be afforded 
thereto. See State v. Hall, 297 N.W.2d 80, 83-84 (Iowa 1980), cerl. denied, 450 U.S. 927 
(1981) (citing MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, § 203 at 491 (E. 
Cleary 2d ed. 1972». 
Despite such criticism, the Frye test is still the applicable standard in most cases 
involving hypnotically refreshed testimony. Hurd, for example, utilizes the Frye stan­
dard as its benchmark in deciding whether hypnotically enhanced testimony is admissi­
ble and reliable. 86 N.J. at 535-36, 432 A.2d at 91; see also People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 
18,35,641 P.2d 775,783-84, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, 252 (1982). 
47. 293 F. at 1014. 
48. See infra notes 54-64 and accompanying text. 
49. See, e.g., Austin v. Barker, 110 A.D. 510, 516-18, 96 N.Y.S. 814, 818-19 (1906); 
People v. Ebanks, 117 Cal. 652, 665, 49 P. 1049, 1053 (1897). 
50. 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302, cerl. denied, 252 Md. 731 (1968), cerl. denied, 
395 U.S. 949 (1969). 
1982) EVIDENCE 287 

refer to the Frye test, but did hold that pretrial hypnotism of a rape 
victim affected the credibility rather than the admissibility of the evi­
dence.51 The testimony was found not to be irreparably tainted by 
the use of hypnosis52 and a precautionary instruction was given to 
the jury.53 
Of the jurisdictions that have addressed the issue of hypnoti­
cally enhanced testimony in the decade following Harding, a major­
ity have adopted the standard espoused by that court. 54 In courts 
that subsequently admitted hypnotically enhanced testimony, ex­
perts were often called to testify, but the courts refused to specifically 
apply the Frye test.55 Seemingly, the courts assumed that the use of 
hypnosis was generally accepted and thought to be reliable by ex­
perts in the field. 56 
By the late 1970's, critics became more numerous and vocal. 
Writers were finding that hypnotically enhanced testimony had seri­
ous dangers which made it less credible than other testimony be­
cause of the inherent difficulty in detecting these dangers.57 
Recently, the highest courts of Minnesota and Arizona have held 
that hypnotically enhanced testimony is induced by a procedure 
which cannot meet the Frye standard of admissibility.58 In State v. 
Mack 59 the Minnesota Supreme.Court found that hypnosis had not 
developed to the point where experts in the field widely shared the 
51. 5 Md. App. at 236, 246 A.2d at 306. 
52. The court stated that the evidence should be admitted where: (1) The proce­
dure used in hypnotizing the victim was fully exposed in the evidence; (2) professional 
psychologist induced the hypnosis and he testified that there was no reason to doubt the 
truth of the victim's statements; and (3) there was sufficient corroboration of the witness' 
testimony. Id. at 247, 246 A.2d at 312. 
53. Id. 
54. See United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667, 669 (9th Cir.), cerl. denied, 444 
U.S. 885 (1979); Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067, 1069 (9th Cir. 1975); Wyller v. 
Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506, 509-10 (9th Cir. 1974); Connolly v. Farmer, 484 
F.2d 456,457 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Narciso, 446 F. Supp. 252, 282 (E.D. Mich. 
1977); Creamer v. State, 232 Ga. 136, 138, 205 S.E.2d 240, 241-42 (1974); People v. 
Smrekar, 68 m. App. 3d 379, 386, 385 N.E.2d 848, 853 (1979); People v. Hughes, 99 
Misc.2d 863, 869-70, 417 N.Y.S.2d 643, 647-48 (Onondaga County Ct. 1979); State v. 
McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 119-23,244 S.E.2d 414,427-29 (1978); State v. Brom, 8 Or. App. 
598,602,494 P.2d 434, 436 (1972); State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1,9,492 P.2d 312, 315 
(1971). 
55. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
56. Id. 
57. See Dillofi', supra note 38, at 22. 
58. State v. Mena, 624 P.2d 1274 (Ariz. 1981); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 
(Minn. 1980). 
59. 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980). 
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view that the results were scientifically reliable.60 Thus, the court 
held that hypnotically enhanced testimony was per se inadmissible 
under the Frye standard.61 
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Arizona in State v. Mena 62 
concluded that the risks in using hypnosis and the unknown conse­
quences therein were so great that the determination of the guilt or 
innocence of an individual should not depend upon its use.63 While 
the court recognized that the use of hypnosis for thereapeutic pur­
poses had been approved by the American Medical Association,64 it 
definitively rejected the use of hypnotically enhanced testimony, 
claiming its use had unknown consequences and created undue dan­
gers of distortion, delusion, and fantasy.65 In sum, both the Arizona 
and Minnesota courts found that until hypnosis had become a 
widely recognized and accepted procedure among experts, such evi­
dence ordinarily must be considered inadmissible. 66 
While the courts in Arizona and Minnesota represent one view, 
Dr. Orne and a majority of experts in the field believe th.at testimony 
60. Id at 768. 
61. Id at 772. The Supreme Court of Minnesota concluded that a hypnotic subject 
is highly susceptible to suggestion and that there is no way to determine from the content 
of the memory itself which parts are accurate, which are fanciful and which are outright 
lies. See id at 769-71. 
See also People v. Shirley, 31 Cal. 3d 18, 641 P.2d 775, 181 Cal. Rptr. 243, cerro 
denied, 103 S. Ct. 133 (1982), where the California Supreme Court recently found that 
the use of hypnosis to restore the memory of a potential witness is not generally accepted 
as reliable by the scientific community thus the Frye test of admissibility was found not 
to be satisfied. In its opinion, the court rejected the Hurd safeguards because of the 
inherent problems and questions regarding the safeguards and because of the great 
problems of suggest ability and reliability in hypnotically refreshed testimony. Id at 37­
40, 641 P.2d at 785-87, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 254-56. 
In a concurring opinion, it was recommended that the approach of Hurd should be 
followed. Id at 72-73, 641 P.2d at 808, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 276. (Richardson, J., concur­
ring). Moreover, Justice Kaus pointed out that it was unwise to adopt aper se rule at this 
point without carefully considering the potential utility of hypnosis in certain instances. 
Id at 74,641 P.2d at 809, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 277-78. (Kaus, J., concurring and dissenting). 
62. 624 P.2d 1274 (Ariz. 1981). 
63. Id at 1279. 
64. See Council on Mental Health, Medical Use of Hypnosis, 168 J.A.M.A. 186 
(1958). 
65. 624 P.2d at 1280. The court concluded that testimony from witnesses who have 
been questioned under hypnosis concerning the subject matter of their proposed testi­
mony was inadmissible in criminal trials from the moment of the hypnotic session for­
ward. Id 
66. Id at 1280; 292 N.W.2d at 771; see also Polk V. State, 48 Md. App. 382,427 
A.2d 1041 (1981), in which the Maryland court found that the Frye test must be satisfied 
before admitting hypnotically refreshed testimony. The court remanded the case to the 
trial court with instructions to determine if hypnosis is a generally acceptable procedure 
in the field. Id at 394, 427 A.2d at 1048. 
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procured from the use of hypnosis may, under the right circum­
stances, yield reasonably reliable results.67 Accordingly, the propo­
nents assert that such evidence satisfies the standards set forth in 
Frye and should be admissible.68 They argue that while disadvan­
tages in using hypnosis may include distortion of memory recall be­
cause of the methods that are employed, such disadvantages also 
exist at nonhypnotic levels.69 
Kroger and Douce believe that hypnosis is a viable, scientific 
tool and can be a new resource in the field of criminal investigation 
if the hypnosis is used by trained interviewers under the direction of 
qualified professionals.70 Although Kroger and Douce conclude that 
there is no simple formula for avoiding bias, the potential for bias is 
greatly alleviated when the evidence produced is not anticipated by 
either the subject or the hypnotist.71 
Although controversy remains, most courts that have addressed 
the issue are willing to admit testimony that was the product of hyp­
notic recall.72 For example, a county court in New York admitted 
the testimony of a witness whose memory was refreshed by hypnosis 
in People v. Hughes,73 The court did not specifically apply the Frye 
test by name but took judicial notice that there was general accept­
ance of hypnosis in the scientific community.74 The court concluded 
that "evidence elicited through hypnosis can be valuable to the de­
termination of the guilt or innocence of those who have been ac­
67. See Orne, The Use and Misuse ofHypnosis in Court, 3 CRIME & JUST. 61, 101 
(1980). It is significant that Dr. Orne, himself a long-time critic of the use of hypnosis in 
the legal process, promulgated the safeguards which were a~opted in Hurd. See supra 
notes 19-20 and accompanying text. Professor Diamond, an implacable foe of investiga­
tive hypnosis, had admitted that Dr. Orne and he concur on nearly all legal issues re­
garding hypnosis. Diamond, supra note 37, at 338 n.l11. 
68. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text for the admissibility test of new 
scientific evidence. 
69. Kroger and Douce,supra note 25, at 358. For an analysis of problems encoun­
tered by eyewitnesses, see generally Marshall, Marquis, & Oskamp, Effects of Kind of 
Question andAtmosphere 0/Interrogation on Accuracy and Completeness ofTestimony, 84 
HARV. L. REV. 1620 (1971); Note, Did Your Eyes Deceive You? Expert Psychological 
Testimony on the Unreliability ofEyewitness Identification, 29 STAN. L. REV. 969 (1977). 
70. Kroger and Douce, supra note 25, at 358. 
71. Id. at 365. 
72. See supra note SO. 
73. 99 Misc. 2d 863, 872-73,417 N.Y.S.2d 643, 649 (Onondaga County Ct. 1979). 
The court in Hughes found that a rape victim's testimony while under hypnosis in which 
she identified the defendant as her assailant and her subsequent recollection of the events 
while in a post-hypnotic state should be admitted into evidence. Id. at 865, 872-73,417 
N.Y.S.2d at 644, 649. 
74. Id. at 871, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 648. 
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cused of crimes."75 
III. ANALYSIS 
A. Nature of the Hurd Safeguards 
Hurd assumes that recollections facilitated by hypnosis are as 
reliable as normal recall when the following six procedural safe­
guards are present.76 
First, the hypnosis must be carried out by a psychiatrist or psy­
chologist who has special training in the use of hypnosis.77 Second, 
the hypnotist must be an independent professional who is not re­
sponsible to the prosecution, since it is undesirable for the hypnotist 
to be involved in the investigation of the case.78 Thus, the hypnotist 
should not do any independent investigative work that could lead 
him to form an opinion about the victim, the defendant, or the event 
that led to the criminal prosecution.79 This safeguard is agreed upon 
by other experts in the fields of law and hypnosis.80 
The third safeguard in Hurd requires that the individual con­
ducting the hypnotic session receive factual information regarding 
the case in written form only.81 The hypnotist should then review 
the written material in isolation so that no one can influence him 
with added information which may color his opinion.82 As in the 
second safeguard, this requirement attempts to eliminate bias which 
potentially could affect the hypnotist's objectivity.83 
75. Id 
76. See 86 N.J. at 545, 432 A.2d at 96. 
77. See Orne, supra note 19, at 99. But see Frankel, The Role of Hypnotism in 
Criminal Investigation, 14 HYPNOSIS Q. 14 (1980) (not requiring the hypnotist to be a 
professional).. 
In People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 379,385 N.E.2d 848 (1979), the court admitted 
the hypnotically refreshed testimony of an eyewitness to a murder. The court required 
that the hypnotist be "competent." Id at 388, 385 N.E.2d at 855. This seems to be a less 
stringent requirement than that set forth in Hurd. See supra note 20. What qualifies one 
as "competent" or "professional" remains a source of controversy. One source defines a 
"qualified" hypnotist as any law enforcement official who has completed a course by a 
recognized school and who has gained expertise by attending recognized seminars or 
advanced schools. Frankel, supra, at 14. This position is contrary to the Hurd require­
ment that the hypnotic sessions be administered by a licensed psychiatrist or psychologist 
with special training in hypnosis to insure a high level of competency in all cases. See 
supra note 20. 
78. Orne, supra note 19, at 99. 
79. Schafer & Rubio, supra note 7, at 83. 
80. Id 
81. Orne, supra note 19, at 99. 
82. Id 
83. Id 
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The fourth Hurd safeguard mandates that the subject be ex­
amined by the hypnotist before hypnosis so that a detailed descrip­
tion of the facts known to him before hypnosis may be elicited.84 
This safeguard ensures that hypnotic recollections can be compared 
to recall before hypnosis.8s Keeping a detailed record is important 
because individuals often recall more about a past event when 
speaking to a psychiatrist or psychologist than when talking to a 
criminal investigator.86 Thus, it may be possible for a subject to re­
call important facts prior to or subsequent to the hypnotic session. 
Keeping a detailed record verifies the existence of such recall. 
The fifth safeguard requires that the entire contact between the 
witness and hypnotist be recorded via videotape.87 Casual com­
ments that are spoken before or after hypnosis may be extremely 
infiuentia1.88 By recording the entire contact, a permanent record is 
available so it can later be determined if there were suggestions 
made to the subject before, during, or after the session.89 This safe­
guard is essential because the possibility of suggestibility is present 
during hypnosis sessions and may be revealed by a videotape.9o 
Further, when sessions are videotaped, other experts in hypnosis are 
allowed to evaluate the validity of the recall.91 Finally, by having a 
videotape, further investigation of that subject is possible as the sub­
ject may remember more details after viewing the videotape. 
The final safeguard adopted in Hurd is that only the witness 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 99-100. Dr. Orne believes that by allowing the hypnotist to have knowl­
edge of the subject's description of the experience before hypnosis is induced, the psychi­
atrist or psychologist can guard against inadvertently adding new elements of the 
experience during the hypnotic session. Id. at 100. 
86. Id. at 99-100. 
87. Id. at 99. Hurd's fifth safeguard is similar to one found in United States v. 
Adams, 581 F.2d 193 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006 (1978). The court there ar­
ticulated mandatory requirements governing the admissibility of hypnotically induced 
testimony. The court concluded that at a minimum there must be complete stenographic 
records kept of hypnotized persons who later testify. The questions asked and responses 
given during the hypnotic sessions were held to be essential to ensure that such evidence 
was admissible. Moreover, the court suggested, but did not mandate, that an audio or 
videotape be made of the interview. Id. at 199 n.12. Contra Diamond, supra note 37. 
Professor Diamond found that even a videotape of everything which took place before, 
during and after the sessions would not necessarily disclose all distortion occurring dur­
ing the session. "Therefore, the confidence expressed by some courts in the protection 
offered by stenographic, audio, or video recordings of the hypnotic session is not justi­
fied." Id. at 339 (footnote omitted). 
88. Orne, supra note 19, at 99. 
89. See id. 
90. See id. 
91. Schafer & Rubio, supra note 7, at 83. 
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and the psychiatrist should be present during any phase of the hyp­
notic session. This safeguard, never mandated by any other court, is 
important because it is easy for observers to inadvertently communi­
cate to the subject that which is expected.92 Dr. Orne has suggested 
that if the prosecution or defendant wish to observe the hypnotic 
session, a one-way screen or a television monitor may be used so that 
the integrity of the session is not jeopardized.93 
While not specifically enumerating it as a safeguard, Hurd also 
required that no subjectivity or suggestibility94 be used during the 
hypnosis.95 For example, the use of leading questions by the hypno­
tist should be prohibited so that he cannot influence responses given 
by the witness.96 Further, no posthypnotic suggestibility can be em­
ployed for this would taint the entire session and render the witness 
incapable of testifying.97 This is because the subject may be vulnera­
ble to suggestion immediately after coming out of the hypnotic 
trance and the subject's subsequent testimony may not be reliable. 
The Hurd requirements were adopted as minimal procedures 
for safeguarding the hypnotic session and courts have the option· to 
add more safeguards to ensure reliability.98 Providing additional in­
formation at trial would help the jury to determine if the hypnoti­
cally enhanced testimony of the witness was reliable.99 Accordingly, 
specific instructions should be given to the jury outlining the risks 
and dangers of hypnosis; expert testimony should be admitted show­
ing the reliability of hypnosis and the procedures employed; and 
there should be an opportunity for the opposing party to cross-ex­
amine the witness and the hypnotist. loo By employing these addi­
tional safeguards, the jury would be provided with adequate means 
to evaluate the credibility of the testimony. 101 These courtroom safe­
guards assure that the jury is fully informed of the dangers involved 
and is able to weigh the evidence accordingly. 
92. Orne, supra note 19, at 100. 
93. Id 
94. Suggestibility occurs when something is introduced indirectly into the thought 
process, for example, through hinting or intimating. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 
1285 (rev. 5th ed. 1979). 
95. 86 N.J. at 549, 432 A.2d at 98. See generally People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App. 3d 
379, 385 N.E.2d 848 (1979); Polk v. State, 48 Md. App. 382, 427 A.2d 1041 (1981). 
96. See Polk v. State, 48 Md. App. 382, 395, 427 A.2d 1041, 1049 (1981). 
97. See Orne, supra note 19, at 99-100. 
98. 86 N.J. at 545,432 A.2d at 96. 
99. Dilloff, supra note 38, at 22. 
100. Id 
101. Id 
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B. Ram!ftcations 0/ Hurd 
The safeguards adopted in Hurd offer a compromise to the in­
creasingly inconsistent positions that have been taken by courts and 
medical experts alike in reacting to hypnotically enhanced test i­
mony.102 The New Jersey courts have now been given definitive 
safeguards, the purpose of which are to ensure that the hypnotic pro­
cedure is credible and reliable. 103 Ultimately, courts in other juris­
dictions that have been confounded by the issuelO4 now have 
concrete guidelines to use in determining the admissibility of hyp­
notically enhanced evidence. 
This article recommends that consistency be employed by courts 
in dealing with the issue of admitting hypnotically enhanced testi­
mony. Although the safeguards set forth in Hurd are burdensome 
and expensive,105 they greatly minimize the risks of using hypnosis 
to enhance important recall. The solution adopted by the Supreme 
Court of New Jersey represents a thoughtful effort to deal with a 
difficult prOblem; namely, what to do about a police technique that 
helps to solve crime but has the potential to inculpate innocent 
persons. 106 
Hurd's safeguards should be considered by those courts that 
have admitted hypnotically enhanced testimony in the past but have 
not adopted specific procedural safeguards. The Supreme Court of 
North Carolina in State v. McQueen,107 for example, adlnitted the 
testimony of a witness whose memory was refreshed by hypnosis but 
102. Graham, Should Our Courts Reject Hypnosis? PARADE MAG., Oct. 25, 1981, 
at 27. For example, the Arizona legislature is planning hearings on a bill which would 
establish safeguards for the admissibility of hypnotically influenced testimony. Id Re­
cently, the highest court of Maryland ordered a re-evaluation of the use of hypnosis. The 
Trials ofHypnosis, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 19, 1981, at 96. 
103. 86 N.J. at 545, 432 A.2d at 96; see Orne, supra note 19, at 98-99. 
104. See Commonwealth v. Juvenile, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2319, 412 N.E.2d 339 
(1980). 
105. Graham, supra note 95, at 17. 
106. Id. The author found that the same problems are presented by confessions 
and police lineups, but the courts have approved such techniques under proper safe­
guards. The author concludes that for many, hypnosis retains an aura of black magic. 
Id 
107. 295 N.C. 96, 244 S.E.2d 414 (1978). In McQueen, an eyewitness to the murder 
of two women had trouble remembering if the defendant had committed the crimes. For 
five years she remained unsure until hypnosis jogged her memory. Id at 101,244 S.E.2d 
at 417. 
The record, however, showed none of the procedures followed by the hypnotist nor 
did it show what was related by the witness while under hypnosis. Id at 101,244 S.E.2d 
at 417. Thus, it could not be determined whether there was suggestibility or subjectivity 
in the hypnotic procedure. Nevertheless, the defendant's conviction for murder was up­
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the court failed to realize the unique and special problems inherent 
in the use of hypnosis. lOS Although the result might not have 
changed, the Hurd safeguards, if strictly enforced in McQueen, 
would have helped reduce suggestibility and unreliability.109 
The Hurd safeguards are a particularly viable alternative for 
those courts which are currently divided on whether to accept hyp­
notically enhanced testimony. For example, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court recently had the opportunity to rule on the 
admissibility of such testimony in Commonwealth v. Juvenile .110 The 
court remanded the case because the trial court failed to make find­
ings of fact on the suggestibility of the procedures employed and the 
reliability of the testimony. I I I In remanding the case, the court gave 
no clear indication of whether the hypnotically enhanced testimony 
would be admitted if proper safeguards were employed. 112 The 
court found that the ultimate issue was one of reliability I 13 and its 
opinion enunciated several possible alternatives. 114 These alterna­
tives ranged from a blanket exclusion as a matter of law to allowing 
the testimony when certain procedures were used to enhance the reli­
ability of the recall. 115 While the court took judicial notice of the 
Hurd safeguards,116 it did not adopt them and, in fact, gave little 
direction as to how hypnotically enhanced testimony should be dealt 
with by the lower court. I 17 
By employing the Hurd safeguards, the supreme judicial court 
would have given lower courts in Massachusetts an operable stan­
held even though the hypnotic testimony was admitted. See also State v. Greer, 609 
S.W.2d 423 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980), vacated, 450 U.S. 1027 (1981). 
108. Note, Admissibility of Present Recollection Restored by Hypnosis, 15 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 357 (1979). The author criticized the lack of procedural safeguards 
employed by the McQueen court and suggested that five safeguards be required. Id at 
369. One of these procedural safeguards was that the jury be instructed that it should not 
place undue weight upon testimony based on hypnotically enhanced memories. Id at 
372. 
109. See Orne, supra note 19, at 99. 
110. 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2319,412 N.E.2d 399 (1980). 
Ill. Id at 2321, 412 N.E.2d at 341. A Boston police detective placed the victim of 
an attack under hypnosis after which she was able to assist in the preparation of a com­
posite picture which led to charges against the defendant. Id at 2319, 412 N.E.2d at 340. 
112. Id at 2324-25, 412 N.E.2d at 343. 
1l3. Id at 2324, 412 N.E.2d at 343. The court did state that consideration of the 
Frye test, or a modification thereof, may be appropriate in determining reliability of 
hypnotically enhanced testimony. Id 
114. Id at 2325, 412 N.E.2d at 343 (citing Diamond, supra note 37). 
115. Id 
116. Id. at 2324 n.8, 412 N.E.2d at 343 n.8. 
117. Id at 2326, 412 N.E:2d at 344. 
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dard that could have been uniformly applied. It is imperative that 
courts begin to promote consistency and ensure reliability in dealing 
with the issue of hypnosis in the law. The Hurd safeguards create a 
workable compromise l18 that have been promulgated by an es­
teemed authority. I 19 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The decision in State v. Hurd comes at a time when courts and 
legal scholars alike are divided on the issue of the admissibility of 
hypnotically enhanced testimony. The case represents a compromise 
that will promote uniformity on the issue. Those courts, comprising 
a majority of the jurisdictions in the United States, that have yet to 
rule on the issue, are given a definitive process which may be em­
ployed. A court may expand upon or ease the procedural safeguards 
in Hurd depending upon the reliability that the court places upon 
the hypnotically refreshed evidence in a particular case. Courts 
hereafter should neither render such evidence inadmissible peT Se 
nor should they admit such evidence without examining the proce­
dures employed to obtain it and records maintained regarding it. 
State v. Hurd is a decision that will shape the immediate future 
of hypnotically enhanced testimony, although scientific research 
may settle the long term controversy. Until then, the law should not 
allow the trend of inconsistent results to continue since the freedom 
of an innocent defendant may rest upon the court's willingness to 
accept such evidence. The procedural safeguards employed in Hurd 
assure consistent results on an issue that longs for consistency. 
Robert E Salad 
118. See The Trials ofHypnosis, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 19, 1981, at 96. 
119. See, Orne, supra note 19, at 99-100. 
